ChatGPT & Aquinas Translation Comparisons
Update (May 16, 2024): I have included translations from Claude 3 Sonnet, which was able to translate at the same speed as ChatGPT 4o.
A new version of ChatGPT has been released. Below is a test to examine its ability to translate selections from Aquinas. In both cases, ChatGPT 4o was able to translate at a speed of 25 words per second. The prompt was “translate from Latin into English. It needs to be accurate.”
Test 1:
Summa Theologica, First Part, Q. 51
Latin:
Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Angeli sicut incorporales intelliguntur.
Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli non habent corpora sibi naturaliter unita. Quod enim accidit alicui naturae, non invenitur universaliter in natura illa, sicut habere alas, quia non est de ratione animalis, non convenit omni animali. Cum autem intelligere non sit actus corporis nec alicuius virtutis corporeae, ut infra patebit, habere corpus unitum non est de ratione substantiae intellectualis inquantum huiusmodi, sed accidit alicui substantiae intellectuali propter aliquid aliud; sicut humanae animae competit uniri corpori, quia est imperfecta et in potentia existens in genere intellectualium substantiarum, non habens in sui natura plenitudinem scientiae, sed acquirens eam per sensus corporeos a sensibilibus rebus, ut infra dicetur. In quocumque autem genere invenitur aliquid imperfectum, oportet praeexistere aliquid perfectum in genere illo. Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae perfectae intellectuales in natura intellectuali, non indigentes acquirere scientiam a sensibilibus rebus. Non igitur omnes substantiae intellectuales sunt unitae corporibus; sed aliquae sunt a corporibus separatae. Et has dicimus Angelos.
Translation 1: ChatGPT 4o
But on the contrary, Dionysius says in Chapter IV of "On the Divine Names" that angels are understood as incorporeal.
I respond that it must be said that angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. For what is accidental to a nature is not found universally in that nature; for example, having wings is not of the essence of an animal, so it does not belong to every animal. Since understanding is not an act of a body nor of any corporeal power, as will be shown below, having a body united is not of the essence of an intellectual substance as such, but is incidental to some intellectual substances for some other reason; just as it is proper for the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists in potentiality in the genus of intellectual substances, not having in its nature the fullness of knowledge, but acquiring it through corporeal senses from sensible things, as will be said below. However, in whatever genus something imperfect is found, it is necessary that something perfect pre-exists in that genus. Therefore, there are some perfect intellectual substances in the intellectual nature, not needing to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Therefore, not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are separated from bodies. And these we call angels.
Translation 2: Alfred J. Freddoso
But contrary to this: In De Divinis Nominibus, chap. 4, Dionysius says, “Angels are understood to be incorporeal.”
I respond: Angels do not have bodies that are naturally united to them. For what happens incidentally to a nature is not found always and everywhere in that nature. For instance, having wings does not belong to every animal because it is not part of the nature animal. But since, as will become clear below (q. 75, a. 2), an act of intellective understanding (intelligere) is not the act of a body or of any corporeal power, having a body united to itself is not part of the nature intellectual substance as such, but rather accrues to some intellectual substances for the sake of something else. For instance, being united to a body belongs to the human soul because the human soul is imperfect and exists in potentiality within the genus intellectual substance, not having the fullness of knowledge within its nature, but instead, as will be explained below (q. 84, a. 6 and q. 89, a. 1), acquiring knowledge from sensible things through the corporeal senses.
Now if in a given genus there is something imperfect, then something perfect must exist in that same genus. Therefore, within the genus intellectual nature there are some perfect intellectual substances that do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Therefore, not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; instead, some of them are separate from bodies. And these are the intellectual substances we call angels.
Translation 3: Fathers of the English Dominican Province
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are understood to be incorporeal.”
I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Question [75], Article [2]), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on (Question [84], Article [6]; Question [89], Article [1]). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.
Translation 4: Claude 3 Sonnet
On the contrary, it is what Dionysius says, in Chapter 4 of The Divine Names, that "angels are understood as incorporeal."
I answer that it must be said that angels do not have bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs accidentally to some nature, is not found universally in that nature; just as having wings, because it does not belong to the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Since, then, to understand is not an act of the body nor of any bodily power, as will be shown later, to have a body united to it does not belong to the concept of an intellectual substance as such, but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. In the way that it befits the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fullness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it through the bodily senses from sensible things, as will be explained below. But in any genus, whatever is found imperfect must pre-exist something perfect in that genus. Therefore, there are some perfect intellectual substances in the intellectual nature, not needing to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Not all intellectual substances, then, are united to bodies; but some are separated from bodies. And we call these angels.
Test 2:
Contra Gentiles, Book 2 - Creation, Chapter 98, Paragraph 10
How one separate substance understands another
Latin:
Ex hoc autem quod substantia aliqua est intellectualis, comprehensiva est totius entis. Unde, cum substantia separata per suam naturam non fiat actu comprehendens totum ens, ipsa, in sua substantia considerata, est quasi potentia ad similitudines intelligibiles quibus totum ens cognoscitur, et illae similitudines erunt actus eius inquantum est intellectualis. Non autem est possibile quin istae similitudines sint plures: quia iam ostensum est quod totius entis universalis perfecta similitudo esse non potest nisi infinita; sicut autem natura substantiae separatae non est infinita sed terminata, ita similitudo intelligibilis in ea existens non potest esse infinita, sed terminata ad aliquam speciem vel genus entis; unde ad comprehensionem totius entis requiruntur plures huiusmodi similitudines. Quanto autem aliqua substantia separata est superior, tanto eius natura est divinae naturae similior; et ideo est minus contracta, utpote propinquius accedens ad ens universale perfectum et bonum; et propter hoc, universaliorem boni et entis participationem habens. Et ideo similitudines intelligibiles in substantia superiori existentes sunt minus multiplicatae et magis universales. Et hoc est quod Dionysius, XII cap. caelestis hierarchiae, dicit, quod Angeli superiores habent scientiam magis universalem; et in libro de causis dicitur quod intelligentiae superiores habent formas magis universales. Summum autem huius universalitatis est in Deo, qui per unum, scilicet per essentiam suam, omnia cognoscit: infimum autem in intellectu humano, qui ad unumquodque intelligibile indiget specie intelligibili propria et ei coaequata.
Translation 1: ChatGPT 4o
From the fact that a substance is intellectual, it is comprehensive of the whole being. Hence, since a separate substance does not become actually comprehensive of the whole being through its nature, it, considered in its substance, is as if in potentiality to the intelligible likenesses by which the whole being is known, and those likenesses will be its acts insofar as it is intellectual. However, it is not possible that these likenesses are not many: for it has already been shown that the perfect likeness of the whole universal being cannot be unless it is infinite; but just as the nature of the separate substance is not infinite but finite, so the intelligible likeness existing in it cannot be infinite but is finite to some extent or genus of being; hence, for the comprehension of the whole being, many such likenesses are required. However, the higher a separate substance is, the more its nature is similar to the divine nature; and therefore it is less contracted, as it approaches more closely to the perfect and universal being and good; and for this reason, it has a more universal participation in the good and being. And therefore, the intelligible likenesses existing in a higher substance are less multiplied and more universal. And this is what Dionysius says in Chapter XII of the "Celestial Hierarchy," that higher angels have more universal knowledge; and it is said in the "Book of Causes" that higher intelligences have more universal forms. However, the summit of this universality is in God, who knows all things through one, namely through His essence: the lowest is in the human intellect, which needs its own specific and equal intelligible species for each intelligible thing.
Translation 2: James F. Anderson
Now, from the very fact that a substance is intellectual, all being lies within the scope of its understanding. Since it is not endowed by its nature with actual understanding of all being, a separate substance, considered in itself, is in potentiality, as it were, to the intelligible likenesses whereby all being is known, and these likenesses will be its act, so far as it is intellectual. It is, however, impossible that these likenesses should not be several. For we have, already shown that the perfect likeness of all being cannot but be infinite. And just as the nature of a separate substance is not infinite, but limited, so an intelligible likeness existing in it cannot be infinite, but is limited to some species or genus of being, so that a plurality of such likenesses is required for the comprehension of all being. Now, the higher the rank of a separate substance, the more is its nature like to the divine; and thus it is less limited, inasmuch as it approaches nearer to the perfection and goodness of the universal being, enjoying, therefore, a more universal participation in goodness and being. The intelligible likenesses existing in the higher substance are, consequently, less numerous and more universal. And this is what Dionysius says in The Celestial Hierarchy, namely, that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge; while in the book On Causes we read [X]: “The higher intelligences have more universal forms.” Now, the apogee of this universality is found in God, who, through one thing, namely, His essence, is cognizant of all things; whereas its lowest realization is in the human intellect, which for each intelligible object needs an intelligible species appropriate to, that object and on a par with it.
Translation 3: The English Dominican Fathers from the Latest Leonine Edition, 1923.
Now from the very fact that a particular substance is intellectual, it is capable of understanding all being. Wherefore, as a separate substance is not, by its nature, made actually to understand all being, that substance, considered in itself, is in potentiality, as it were, to the intelligible images whereby all being is known, and these images will be its acts, according as it is intellectual. But it is not possible that these images be otherwise than several: for it has been already proved that the perfect image of the whole universal being cannot be but infinite; and just as the nature of a separate substance is not infinite, but limited, so an intelligible image existing therein cannot be infinite, but is confined to some species of genus of being: wherefore several such images are requisite for the comprehension of all being. Now, the higher a separate substance is, the more is its nature similar to the divine; and consequently it is less limited, as approaching nearer to the perfection and goodness of the universal being, and for this reason it has a more universal participation of goodness and being. Consequently the intelligible images that are in the higher substance are less numerous and more universal. This agrees with the statement of Dionysius (Cael. Hier. xii.) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge: and it is said in De Causis that the higher intelligences have more universal forms. Now, the highest point of this universality is in God, Who knows all things by one, namely His essence: whereas the lowest is in the human intellect, which, for each intelligible object, requires an appropriate intelligible species commensurate with that object.
Translation 4: Claude 3 Sonnet
From the fact that some substance is intellectual, it comprehends the totality of being. Hence, since a separate substance does not become actually comprehending the totality of being through its own nature, the substance itself, considered in itself, is as it were a potentiality for the intelligible likenesses through which the totality of being is known, and those likenesses will be its actualities insofar as it is intellectual. But it is not possible that these likenesses are not multiple: because it has already been shown that there cannot be a perfect, universal likeness of the totality of being except an infinite one; just as the nature of a separate substance is not infinite but limited, so the intelligible likeness existing in it cannot be infinite, but limited to some species or genus of being; whence for the comprehension of the totality of being, multiple such likenesses are required. Moreover, the higher any separate substance is, the more similar its nature is to the divine nature; and therefore it is less contracted, as approaching more closely to perfect universal being and goodness; and because of this, it has a more universal participation in goodness and being. And therefore the intelligible likenesses existing in a higher substance are less multiplied and more universal. And this is what Dionysius says in Chapter 12 of The Celestial Hierarchy, that the higher angels have more universal knowledge; and in The Book of Causes it is said that the higher intelligences have more universal forms. But the highest of this universality is in God, who through one thing, namely His essence, knows all things: but the lowest is in the human intellect, which for each intelligible thing requires its own proper and coequal intelligible species.